Introduction
In 1971, the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) published the second edition of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code (which at that time was know as the International Zoosanitary Code). It listed 43 diseases, of which only three were foodborne zoonoses: brucellosis, bovine tuberculosis and trichinosis. The word 'zoonoses' did not appear in the glossary of this edition of the Terrestrial Code and its preface stated: 'This Code has been established with a view to working out, in the general interest, a common doctrine of protection of the national livestocks against the spread of the epizootics which threaten all the Regions of the World' (29) . No mention was made of public health or surveillance.
In the 2012 OIE list of notifiable diseases there are 90 disease entities, 30 of them zoonotic, of which 13 are foodborne zoonotic diseases (32) . In the 2012 edition of the Terrestrial Code, the word 'zoonoses' appears in the glossary, and the foreword states: 'The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (Terrestrial Code) sets out standards for the improvement of terrestrial animal health and welfare and veterinary public health worldwide'. In addition, this edition of the Terrestrial Code includes sections on veterinary public health and surveillance (33) .
While animal health has always been the traditional task of veterinarians and Veterinary Services, in recent decades the prevention of foodborne diseases from an animal source has become a primary objective of the food-producing sectors of national Veterinary Services, hence these changes in the OIE Terrestrial Code.
Food animal producers are primarily interested in the health of their animals as it affects their production parameters and profits, and are less interested in public health aspects. Unless these public health diseases are also an animal health problem or national or regional regulations require them to take certain actions, control or eradication of these diseases will not be a major concern of producers.
As a result of these changes there must be integration or at least close collaboration between the Veterinary Services and Public Health Services of a country or region. In some countries, food agencies have been established which combine the food-producing sectors of the Ministries of Agriculture and Health. In other countries, these Ministries act independently and, where necessary, collaborate to integrate their policies. This integration also applies to surveillance programmes, both passive and active, which form the basis of animal and human disease control policies.
This review is restricted to general surveillance policies specific to foodborne diseases from an animal source. For further information, the reader is referred to Chapter 1.4. of the 2012 edition of the Terrestrial Code, 'Animal Health Surveillance', in which the specifics of animal health surveillance programmes are discussed. Surveillance of foodborne diseases in the human population is also necessary, to help determine priorities in animal disease control. This paper will not be an exhaustive review of all foodborne animal diseases, but will rather give examples of surveillance of these diseases in the animal population, to illustrate the factors that must be taken into consideration when planning an integrated surveillance system.
Classification of foodborne diseases of animal origin
For the purposes of this paper, animal diseases can be divided into four groups: -diseases that are mainly an animal health problem, but can have foodborne public health implications (it is in the producer' s primary interest to prevent diseases like this) -diseases that are both an animal health problem and a foodborne public health problem -diseases that are primarily or only a public health consideration as foodborne infections in humans and rarely cause disease in animals -diseases that are only an animal health problem and have no public health significance.
Diseases that are mainly an animal health problem
An example of a foodborne zoonosis originating in poultry that can have foodborne public health implications is highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) due to H5N1. While H5N1 is not primarily a foodborne pathogen, the consumption of undercooked poultry has been implicated as a possible source of transmission (4) and many countries have put regulations into place that assume this method of transmission. Highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) in commercial poultry is usually identified by its acute onset and high mortality or drop in egg production. Therefore, active surveillance might not be necessary. Passive surveillance, through compulsory reporting of suspected and diagnosed cases, is usually enough to identify these cases. On the other hand, low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) (H5N1) can circulate in all poultry types with few or no clinical signs and, at some point, mutate to a highly pathogenic virus (23) . In commercial water fowl, HPAI (H5N1) can be subclinical (24) . For these cases active surveillance would be necessary.
Within the mammalian realm, a somewhat similar situation is found with Q fever in goats. The pathogen is abortifacient. Mass abortions in goats, causing serious economic losses, lead to the need for vaccination. The causative agent of Q fever, Coxiella burnetii, can infect humans by the airborne route. Contamination of animal products, mainly milk and dairy products, may occur, since infected females can shed C. burnetii in their milk for several months, even over several milking seasons (3) . Active surveillance in goats will not help in reducing the infection rate in humans. It is in the producer' s primary interest to prevent such significant diseases.
Diseases that are both an animal health and foodborne public health problem
Paratyphoid Salmonella, including Salmonella Enteritidis and S. Typhimurium, cause a disease that poses a health risk for both humans and animals (particularly poultry). Each of these bacteria can cause serious clinical disease in young poultry, but rarely in mature poultry. On the other hand, poultry of all ages are often carriers of Salmonella without any clinical signs and also without any influence on production parameters (13) . In humans, paratyphoid Salmonella is one of the most common causes of bacterial enteritis, often being caused by infected poultry and other foods from animal sources (7) . For some serotypes in poultry, such as S. Enteritidis, vertical transmission takes place from breeding stock to broilers or egg-layers while, for others, transmission occurs through poor egg and hatchery sanitation (21) . Routine active surveillance of poultry, especially breeding stock, is necessary to identify infected birds and respond in a way that will reduce the contamination of poultry products. Salmonella control programmes, including surveillance, have been implemented in many countries, followed by significant reductions in human infections. An outline of such a programme has been included in Chapter 6.5. of the Terrestrial Code: 'Prevention, detection and control of Salmonella in poultry'.
In mammals, Brucella abortus, B. melitensis and bovine tuberculosis are examples of zoonoses which are both animal health and public health problems (31) . These diseases are included among the oldest known zoonoses historically subjected to official veterinary control. Successful eradication programmes, which include surveillance as a key part of the programme, have been applied globally. Outlines of such programmes are described in detail in the respective chapters of the OIE Terrestrial Code. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy is a more recent example of a disease belonging to this group.
Diseases that are primarily or only a public health concern
Campylobacter jejuni and C. coli are major causes of bacterial enteritis in humans. It is questionable whether these organisms cause disease in poultry (17) and they have not been included in the OIE Terrestrial Code. However, surveys have shown high infection rates in poultry, and poultry products have been identified as a significant source of human infections (17) . Active surveillance is the only way of identifying infected food-producing animals. Examples of mammalian diseases which also belong to this group are verocytotoxigenic Escherichia coli (in particular O157:H7), for which the predominant reservoir is healthy cattle (30) , and trichinosis, for which the predominant reservoir is swine.
Diseases that are only an animal health problem and have no public health significance
While not foodborne diseases per se, some of these diseases pose a food-related public health concern in terms of biological residues.
Coccidial infections are common in poultry. Coccidia are usually species-specific and have no public health significance (18) . However, due to their high persistence in the poultry environment and their potential to cause serious disease in intensively raised poultry, anticoccidial drugs are often included in poultry feed. If there are residues of these drugs in the poultry product, this can be a public health problem (18) . Active surveillance of slaughtered poultry and/or poultry products is important to identify these residues. This is also true of antimicrobial residues of drugs used to treat other foodborne or non-foodborne diseases.
In mammals, there are various non-zoonotic diseases, curatively or preventively addressed by mass treatment with antibacterial or other preparations, and any residues of these medicines in the food derived from animals are regarded as potentially harmful to consumers. In some conditions, antibiotics, sulfonamides and other antibacterial drugs are applied to prevent secondary infections, e.g. in viral diseases such as foot and mouth disease, peste des petits ruminants, sheep and goat pox, contagious ecthyma (orf) and lumpy skin disease; or medicines are applied to target the causative pathogen itself (e.g. bacterial, mycoplasmal, protozoan and helminth diseases, such as haemorrhagic septicaemia, contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, contagious agalactia, babesiosis, gastrointestinal nematodes, fasciolosis and others).
Planning a surveillance programme for foodborne animal-derived diseases
In all of the disease groups mentioned above, and for each pathogen, different surveillance methods are applicable in the veterinary and public health sectors and the balance between animal health interests and public health interests must be considered. If diseases are mainly an animal health problem, there is less need for government enforcement of surveillance by regulation. For diseases that are mainly a public health problem, legislation may be necessary to enforce surveillance programmes. The amount of regulation needed is determined by the balance between the producer' s interests and the interests of public health.
When planning a surveillance programme for an animal disease that is also a foodborne disease, many factors must be taken into consideration. These factors are listed below. They are also summarised, in chronological order of the decision-making process, in Table I .
The relative incidence, morbidity, mortality and economic costs of foodborne disease in humans
As this review concerns 'animal health and food safety', it is clear that the first step in the development of a surveillance programme for an animal is to decide whether a pathogen from an animal source is cause for concern in food safety and human health. The word 'relative' is used in the heading of this section because the importance of a pathogen changes from area to area and at different times. A foodborne disease which is considered important in a developed country might be thought relatively less important in a developing country. Salmonellosis is a major foodborne disease in most developed countries, partly as a result of the intensive production of poultry and the high consumption of poultry meat and eggs. In developing countries, salmonellosis is less important since fewer poultry are consumed and most are raised in small backyard flocks (25) . Of even greater significance is the fact that other diseases, such as malaria, human immunodeficiency virus and tuberculosis, have a much higher incidence, morbidity rate, mortality rate and economic cost (28) . A country trying to improve the health status of its population will spend its limited health budget on controlling these diseases, rather than on Salmonella surveillance and control in thousands of small backyard flocks, with limited potential for success.
Until the 1970s, routine isolation methods for stool samples did not isolate C. jejuni and C. coli. As a result, Campylobacter was not considered a major cause of enteritis in humans and there was no reason for surveillance in animals. The development of selective growth media in the 1970s enabled more laboratories to test stool specimens for Campylobacter (2) . Once the importance of these bacteria became known, demand increased for measuring the prevalence of these bacteria in food-producing animals.
In the European Union (EU), it was shown that five Salmonella serotypes are the most prevalent in humans. Poultry regulations were introduced that principally addressed these five serotypes (10).
While one does not like to attempt to measure human suffering in monetary terms, this is necessary because all countries have a limited budget and governments must make decisions based on economic considerations. In the United States (USA), national estimates of the annual costs of medical care and lost productivity due to foodborne Salmonella infections range from US$0.5 to 2.3 billion (12) . Estimates such as these give the human and animal health sectors objective data upon which to base their decisions.
Since 1977, it has been recognised that some diarrhoeagenic strains of E. coli produce toxins that have an irreversible cytopathic effect on cultured Vero cells. Such verocytotoxigenic E. coli (VTECs) belong to over 100 different serotypes. Escherichia coli O157:H7 is the predominant and most virulent serotype in a pathogenic subset of VTECs, designated enterohaemorrhagic E. coli (EHEC). This designation is based on their capacity to cause haemorrhagic colitis and haemolytic uraemic syndrome in humans, their ability to produce verocytotoxins (VTs) and to cause attaching and effacing lesions on epithelial cells, and their possession of a characteristic large plasmid (31) . Ruminants are the main natural host of VTECs and are generally healthy carriers of the organisms. Since the early 1990s, VTEC O157:H7 has grown in importance worldwide as a public health problem. Despite its pathogenicity for humans, infection in animals with E. coli O157:H7 is invariably asymptomatic. The presence of VTECs in animal faeces means that these organisms can potentially enter the food chain by faecal contamination of milk products, contamination of meat with intestinal contents during the slaughter process or contamination of fruit and vegetables by contact with infected manure. Verocytotoxigenic E. coli strains are also transmitted through contaminated water and by direct contact with infected people or animals (31). The above examples illustrate the fact that the public health sector must first identify and quantify the important human foodborne pathogens before turning to the animal health sector.
Are animals an exclusive or significant source of human foodborne infections?
Not all enteric infections of humans are animal-derived foodborne infections. Unless researchers are confident that the source of the human infection is from the animal sector, surveillance in this sector would be a waste of resources. Before commencing a surveillance and control programme, epidemiological studies must be carried out to identify the specific animal population, if any, that is the source of the human infection.
Clostridium botulinum and C. perfringens are major causes of food poisoning, but these are related to food preparation and not infections in animals (5). While we may identify these pathogens in the gastrointestinal tract of animals, these have no significance in public health and surveillance will be of no avail. Shigella species cause foodborne disease that infects only humans and primates (6) . Other animals, including food-producing animals, are not infected by these bacteria. Infection is usually transmitted from human to human and so no surveillance is called for in animals, not even in primates, unless there is a specific outbreak which is linked to primates (16).
On the other hand, cattle are considered the main reservoir of E. coli O157:H7 infection for humans; thus, surveillance should target this species in particular (31).
While paratyphoid Salmonella can infect all mammal and avian species, specific serotypes are more frequently associated with certain species and production types. When S. Enteritidis emerged as a major Salmonella serotype in human infections in the 1980s and 1990s, it was not clear at first what the source of these infections was. Epidemiological studies showed that cases of S. Enteritidis were most commonly associated with table eggs (19, 20) . Data and epidemiological studies in chickens (Gallus gallus) confirmed these findings and, as a result, control programmes, including surveillance specifically targeted at the egg production sector, were initiated in many countries.
In order to decide if an animal population is the exclusive or a significant source of a human foodborne infection and, if so, which sectors of the animal population are involved, the public health sector, together with the animal health sector, must review the literature and existing epidemiological data. Additional studies may be needed to answer the questions noted above for the country or region concerned.
What kind of surveillance is needed to identify the disease-causing agent in an animal population?
When planning a surveillance programme, and deciding whether to use active or passive surveillance methods, researchers should be familiar with the clinical and epidemiological manifestations of the disease. Are the clinical signs severe enough in most cases to ensure diagnosis or is this a disease that can take a subclinical form and evade diagnosis unless specific diagnostic tests are performed? At times, both types of surveillance may be necessary.
Verocytotoxigenic E. coli strains are not included in the OIE Terrestrial Code. However, considering their extreme significance for public health and food safety, and the fact that infection can only be determined by active surveillance, the OIE has decided to dedicate a special chapter in its
Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals
(the Terrestrial Manual) to diagnostic techniques for these pathogens, including animal faeces screening (31).
In countries with good reporting systems, HPAI H5N1 in poultry will probably be diagnosed within a short time of infection, due to its high mortality rate and/or severe drop in egg production. Passive surveillance through compulsory reporting and good record-keeping is usually enough to identify outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 in poultry. On the other hand, this same virus can be present in wild aquatic birds with no clinical signs (24), while LPAI H5N1 can circulate in a poultry population and subsequently mutate into a highly pathogenic virus (23) . Thus, active surveillance is important for these viruses and the OIE has set standards for such programmes in Chapter 10.4. of the Terrestrial Code.
Salmonella can cause clinical disease in very young poultry but in older broilers and adult poultry, this infection is nearly always subclinical, with no negative effects on the carrier birds (13) . On the other hand, these infected poultry are a major source of human Salmonella infections, either via the meat or eggs or through vertical transmission of infection from the parent bird to layers or broilers, and consequent human consumption of the eggs or meat. The only way to identify infected flocks is by active surveillance. Over the past two decades, standard procedures have been developed for active surveillance of Salmonella in general, and S. Enteritidis and S. Typhimurium in particular (14, 15) . Active surveillance for Salmonella has become a common practice in the poultry industry and is described in detail in Chapter 6.5. of the Terrestrial Code. It must be emphasised that this surveillance is carried out mainly for public health reasons.
The animal health sector must examine the available diagnostic methods, clinical or laboratory, and decide, based on their relative sensitivity or specificity, what kind of surveillance is needed and which tests should be used to identify and control the disease.
Eradication or reduction of disease?
Are we interested in identifying all cases of a disease in order to eradicate it, or is our aim to reduce its incidence in the animal population, thereby reducing its occurrence in the human population?
When animal and public health services are presented with a disease problem, a risk assessment must be carried out to plan further steps. As many diseases are difficult or impossible to eradicate from a population, policy-makers must decide what their short-and long-term health goals are.
When Salmonella control programmes began in the poultry industry two things became clear immediately:
-the eradication of all Salmonella from commercial poultry will take many decades and our initial goal should be to reduce the infection level -certain serotypes, such as S. Enteritidis, which account for a significant number of human infections and whose epidemiology is better understood, could be eradicated from commercial poultry relatively quickly.
Most countries therefore developed active surveillance programmes that could identify all S. Enteritidis infections in breeding flocks with a high probability, so that infected flocks could be culled. As a result, S. Enteritidis has been eradicated from all poultry breeding flocks in many countries, while other serotypes have been reduced but not eradicated (9, 31) .
In the EU influenza surveillance programme for poultry, it was determined that: 'Sampling shall be stratified throughout the territory of the whole Member State, so that samples can be considered as representative for the whole of the Member State, taking into account:
-the number of holdings to be sampled (excluding ducks, geese and turkeys) shall be defined so as to ensure 95% probability of identifying at least one positive holding if the prevalence of sero-positive holdings is at least 5% and -the number of birds sampled from each holding shall be defined so as to ensure 95% probability of identifying at least one positive bird if the prevalence of seropositive birds is ≥30% [11] .'
In the case of EU legislation, it was decided that, because of the high infectivity of the virus, it would be enough to be able to identify the infection only after 5% of flocks, and 30% of the birds within a flock, were infected. In the USA, on the other hand, it was decided to test 100% of all flocks going to slaughter (26) .
These risk assessments must be carried out in collaboration between the public health and animal health sectors.
The ability to control disease in the animal population
If there is no practical way to lower the incidence of or eradicate a disease in the animal population, surveillance programmes to identify its incidence and distribution are of limited use, other than for academic reasons or in anticipation of control methods being developed. Campylobacter in poultry has been identified as a major source of infection in humans (17) . The epidemiology of this bacterium in poultry is not well understood and various control measures are being developed specifically for this pathogen. At this time, however, there are no recommended standards of practice to control it in poultry. Campylobacter is not even listed in the OIE Terrestrial Code. This omission from the Code, despite its being an important zoonosis, is probably due to the lack of practical recommendations to reduce infection in poultry. In a baseline survey on the prevalence of Campylobacter in broilers in the EU in 2008, the prevalence of Campylobacter-contaminated carcasses was 75.8%. Member State prevalence varied from 4.9% to 100% (8) . In countries with a high Campylobacter prevalence, more research and improved infrastructure are needed before surveillance can be useful.
However, classical zoonoses, such as bovine tuberculosis and brucellosis, have been controlled and indeed eradicated in many developed countries, due to the integrated efforts of governments and stakeholders, and generally backed by compensation for the culling of infected animals or whole herds. Animal identification systems were an essential component in these achievements, alongside effective control of animal movements and surveillance programmes.
Most countries in the world are free from HPAI. Active and passive surveillance have proven to be very useful in these countries by identifying the disease early, stamping out any outbreaks and using surveillance to identify spread. Over the years, many countries have experienced outbreaks of HPAI and succeeded in halting these outbreaks, with surveillance as an important tool (1).
The animal health sector is responsible for the control of diseases in animal populations. The public health sector must consult with animal health professionals to determine if a foodborne animal disease can be effectively controlled before requesting that a surveillance and control programme be put into place.
The availability, sensitivity, specificity and cost of disease detection tests
Before carrying out any surveillance, the diagnostic test or tests must be readily available and cost effective in the country or region where they will be used. The choice of tests depends upon the laboratory equipment and training of the personnel. The required sensitivity of the test should be related to the consequences of missing cases, and the required specificity will rely on the cost of basing conclusions on a large number of false positives.
In developed countries, the availability of cost-effective, reliable, validated diagnostic tools, in conjunction with surveillance systems and disease control policies, has led to remarkable advances, as farms, regions and entire countries have gained disease-free status for bovine tuberculosis and brucellosis (31) .
When it comes to HPAI, there are many methods of diagnosis. In many cases, it can be identified by clinical signs, but this is a method of low specificity and sensitivity and, if a stamping-out policy is in effect, this will result in non-infected flocks being destroyed and infected flocks not being identified. The virus can be identified with very high sensitivity and specificity by virus isolation in embryonated eggs. This method relies on the availability of embryonated eggs of the correct age, a well-equipped laboratory and experienced laboratory workers. Diagnosis by viral isolation usually takes two or more days after injection of the embryonated eggs and these can be crucial days lost. Molecular methods, such as reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and real-time RT-PCR, can cut the time down from days to hours (22) . These newer methods, however, are expensive and rely on expensive equipment. Countries that do not have ready access to molecular methods or traditional viral isolation will have problems diagnosing the disease in a timeframe that allows them to prevent its spread. If the public health sector wishes to eradicate the disease in the human population, it must work together with the animal health sector in establishing laboratories that can rapidly diagnose the disease in poultry. These laboratories could even be joint public and animal health laboratories.
When paratyphoid Salmonella became a major cause of human enteric disease, there were no validated procedures available that could identify, with a high level of sensitivity, healthy poultry flocks that were Salmonella carriers. Before national surveillance was begun, methods were developed for environmental sampling that proved to be highly correlated with the infection in poultry, and could be used as a measure for identifying infected flocks. This, in turn, led to further treatment of infected poultry products or even stamping out, if breeder flocks were involved (27) .
The animal health sector is responsible for developing and carrying out the required diagnostic tests for an effective surveillance programme.
Are the industry and regulatory bodies prepared?
Do the industry and regulatory bodies have the ability to carry out effective surveillance followed by the appropriate actions?
For surveillance to be effective, the programme must be funded to cover the costs of objectively testing a representative sample, as determined by the factors mentioned above. When a surveillance programme is developed, risk assessments and statistical analyses are carried out to determine which populations to test and how many farms or animals should be tested in each population. Based on these calculations, predictions can be made as to the resulting improvement in human health. However, if the sampling omits significant populations or is not random, then the predicted goals cannot be achieved. In addition, after the surveillance results are known, there must be sufficient funding to carry out the necessary courses of action decided upon, whether this involves culling, treatment, or further processing of the animal product. In S. Enteritidis control programmes for table egg layers, the EU has legislated that eggs from flocks that test positive for S. Enteritidis must be diverted to pasteurisation (10) . If the industry does not have enough pasteurisation facilities, then these eggs must be destroyed so that infected eggs do not enter the fresh egg market. Before surveillance begins, the authorities must be sure that they have enough pasteurisation ability or be prepared with funding to destroy eggs. In addition, they must be sure that there is a market for the pasteurised egg products.
Even if the above is planned properly in every respect, producers might raise objections to the surveillance programme. Appropriate legislation must be in place before the programme is implemented, to be sure that it can be enforced. The EU passed a series of regulations on zoonoses programmes, dealing mainly with Salmonella, before putting these programmes into practice (10) . As a result, the EU had the legislative and financial ability to carry out its surveillance and control programmes.
In addition to funding and legislation, it is important to have the cooperation of the producers. Education programmes must be put in place at various levels to explain the importance of the programme, how it will be carried out, what is expected from the farmers and how much compensation will be paid in cases where this proves necessary.
No matter how scientific a surveillance and control programme is, if there is no cooperation from the producers, and if the necessary legislation and funding are not in place, then the programme will fail. Enfin, le pays, la région ou l'agence en charge sont-ils dotés des ressources réglementaires, financières et éducatives nécessaires pour exercer cette surveillance et pour en assurer le suivi au moyen d'une action efficace ? Au vu des réponses à ces questions, les secteurs de la santé animale et de la santé publique pourront décider ensemble si la surveillance et le contrôle sont des objectifs atteignables. Si tel est le cas, ils pourront procéder à la mise en place d'un programme approprié.
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tipos de Servicios; o bien centralizar en un solo organismo el trabajo de cuantos intervienen en el tema. La vigilancia es un elemento importante de esos programas de lucha. Para concebir programas de vigilancia eficaces hay que dar respuesta previamente a los siguientes interrogantes. ¿Cuáles son los niveles relativos de incidencia, morbilidad y mortalidad en el ser humano, así como el costo económico, de las enfermedades transmitidas por los alimentos? ¿Es la población animal la fuente exclusiva o una fuente importante de determinada infección humana transmitida por los alimentos? ¿Qué tipo de vigilancia se requiere para localizar al agente etiológico de una enfermedad en la población animal? ¿Cuál es el objetivo: detectar todos los casos de una enfermedad con el fin de erradicarla o reducir su incidencia en la población animal? ¿Estamos capacitados para controlar la enfermedad en la población animal? ¿Qué pruebas de detección de la enfermedad existen? ¿Qué sensibilidad, especificidad y costo tienen esas pruebas de diagnóstico? Y por último: ¿cuenta el país, la región o el organismo en cuestión con los recursos jurídicos, económicos y educativos necesarios para instituir esa labor de vigilancia y acompañarla de las medidas adecuadas? Una vez despejados estos interrogantes, los sectores de la sanidad animal y la salud pública deben determinar conjuntamente si tal labor de vigilancia y control es factible, y en caso afirmativo empezar a elaborar un programa apropiado.
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